While it appears athletic conference re-alignment is taking a break in 2011 after a raucous 2010 (although several moves are only just happening in 2011-12 and 2012-13 based on 2010 agreements), don't be so sure everything is settled in the nation's midlands.
Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs might have been a monster hit for Disney in the '30s and '40s, and there might be two "reboots" in the works for release in 2012, but the theme and the image remain no fun if you're one of the dwarfs.
The Big 12 Conference had always been Texas and the Eleven Dwarfs, much to Oklahoma's, Nebraska's, and A&M's displeasure. The other schools weren't happy, either, but they didn't have the power to sulk vocally on a big stage. When the Big 12 was formed in early 1994, for play to begin in the 1996-97 academic year, Texas immediately started flexing its muscle.
First, they successfully lobbied for former Southwest Conference commish Steve Hatchell to become the first Big 12 commissioner. Nebraska and Oklahoma had supported Kansas athletic director Bob Frederick for the position.
Second, the Big 12 office was placed in a Dallas suburb, not in Kansas City as the Big 8 schools preferred. Third, the conference's split into two divisions followed a Texas plan, which ruined the huge annual Nebraska-Oklahoma rivalry. New schedules dictated that the schools would meet only two out of every four years, since they were placed in different divisions.
Fourth and not least, Nebraska lost a struggle over academic standards. These Big 8 losses and Texas victories were not lost on Nebraska legend Tom Osborne. Lest you think I'm somehow pro-Cornhusker in this argument, it has to be admitted that Nebraska was never in favor of revenue sharing. Boo.
Worst of all was the perspective on the superconference in 1996. Incredibly enough, the victorious official view of Big 12 conference history was that a brand new conference had been created, and that the Big 12 was not an expansion of the Big 8 (which it obviously was). Are you serious? Is the Texas ego that big that it cannot admit the Southwest Conference had failed? Apparently, that is the case.
Blame also goes to the self-serving Texas Legislature, which arbitrarily decided that Baylor should be the sole private school included in the Big 12. Baylor won out over TCU, SMU, and Rice, some of which had greater athletic legacies. Why? There were more Baylor alums in the Legislature. Also, Oklahoma, Texas, and A&M didn't want competition from those Dallas- and Houston-based schools for the star recruits from all of the high schools in those regions. Baylor sits out in Waco. TCU administrators never forgot about the unjust slight.
Flash-forward to June of 2010: After years of playing in the shadow of the Longhorns, Nebraska and Osborne bolted to the Big 10, where revenue sharing and lucrative network deals (including revenues generated from their own Big 10 Conference Network) were the norm. Now, Nebraska has to deal with new monsters who cast giant shadows of their own by the names of Ohio State, Penn State, and Michigan. However, at least they wear smaller hats and don't treat their conference rivals as dwarfs.
Meanwhile, new Pac-10 commissioner Larry Scott and his assistant, former Big 12 commissioner from 1998 to 2007 Kevin Weiberg, were busy wooing five teams (Texas, A&M, OU, OSU, Tech) to join a proposed superconference Pac-16, with Utah. While well received in Lubbock, Scott and Weiberg felt the temperature drop in College Station and Austin. Why? A&M preferred joining the SEC if they had to find greener pastures, and Texas was secretly negotiating with ESPN to develop their own network. Repeat: the Longhorns were working on creating a Longhorn Network, not a Big 12 Conference Network, with the help and financing from ESPN.
Texas was not impressed with the Pac-10's proposal of fairness and total revenue sharing in all future deals, nor with its plan for a Pac-16 Conference Network. Texas enjoyed its stature and fame as Snow White. Big 12 Commissioner Dan Beebe was willing to do anything to keep Texas from moving. The result? ABC/ESPN kept its deal with the Big 12 intact while giving Texas its own $300 million, 20-year deal to launch the Longhorn Network on August 26, 2011.
The new network, in and of itself a recruiting tool of the most impressionable kind, tantamount to Notre Dame's exclusive NBC deal for football, keeps Texas way ahead of the Big 12 pack in revenue streams, even as the conference presidents agreed to greater revenue sharing of television money in the other contracts with Fox and ABC/ESPN. The new arrangement calls for the league to split 76% of its television revenue evenly, up from 57%.
What is another source for athletic funding? Try endowments. Here again, Texas has a huge advantage, with an endowment of $12.2 billion. A&M is second with an impressive $5.738 billion, Baylor third with $1.1 billion, and Kansas fourth with $955 million. Meanwhile, Oklahoma State has a $454 million endowment, Iowa State $452 million, and Kansas State $259 million at the lower end of the scale.
What impresses recruits? Winning traditions and professional athlete alumni. What else? Flashy things: weight rooms, locker rooms, equipment rooms, equipment, dorm rooms, cafeterias, cafeteria menus, tutoring centers, ipods, ipads, MacBooks, smartphones, football stadiums, basketball arenas, and attractive co-eds. Who has flashier things, Texas or Kansas State?
How does one keep a winning tradition? Give the head coach raises, bonuses, and perks to retain him. Have a large budget so the coach can have a quality support staff of assistant coaches and trainers. How does one create a winning tradition? Have the resources to hire the big name and the resources to give the big name the quality staff, equipment, and facilities he needs to stay and develop the program.
Sounds easy enough. But not if you're one of the dwarfs contending with Snow White for all of the prized recruits.
It does not take a rocket scientist to see that the Big 12 did not have a level playing field at its inception, during its first fifteen years, and does not now entering its sixteenth year. The playing field remains tilted for the foreseeable future, as long as the Longhorn Network is around.
What does the future hold for the Big 12? Mind you, the following are just rumors found on the Internet, but where there's smoke, there's fire. Some scenarios are more credible than others. First, schools that have voiced displeasure with Texas and flirted with other conferences include Oklahoma and Texas A&M (SEC), Texas Tech and Oklahoma State (Pac-10/12), and Missouri (Big 10). What does that mean? Core members of any future Big 12 include stalwarts Kansas, Kansas State, Iowa State, and Baylor. Notice I did not include Texas. Many scenarios have the Longhorns going independent (to better fit their own TV network) or creating a superconference with Notre Dame, BYU, and USC, among others. It is difficult to conceive of them joining the SEC, Big 10, or Pac 12 without wishing to consider it a whole new league upon expansion with their inclusion (as they did with the Big 8 in 1994). Those leagues, dealing from strength, wouldn't take kindly to such an interpretation.
The following are logical scenarios for Big 12 expansion back to 12 teams. ESPN wouldn't mind seeing the Big 12 recapture the Denver media market with a get of Colorado State or Air Force. Also, the Salt Lake City market beats Omaha, so BYU would be another good get.
Farther east, Arkansas, Louisville, Memphis, and Cincinnati are possibilities. Memphis would be the easiest get since they are the only one in a non-BCS conference at present. The others would need a sweeter pot to bolt their current leagues.
Many casual observers laugh when Notre Dame is mentioned as a possible school for the Big 12. Geographically, it doesn't make sense. Economically, it probably doesn't make sense. But hold on! Didn't TCU recently join the Big East with all of its sports? Geographical convenience is almost a non-factor in 2011. Economically, ABC/ESPN and Fox could sweeten their already extant TV contracts with the Big 12, ensuring Notre Dame a competitive figure and the other schools taking no reductions. In that case, BYU and Notre Dame would be high-profile additions, and secure the Big 12 a prosperous future.
Most logical would be for other fine Texas schools like SMU, Rice, or Houston to join the Big 12. However, that won't happen for the recruiting-disadvantage and network-influence reasons discussed above unless other Texas schools leave. The conference office is probably fine with a maximum of four Texas universities in the league. If A&M bolts to the SEC and Tech bolts to the Pac-12, that leaves room for a Rice or Houston (not both) and SMU to join up.
However, television networks have most of the power. What they say goes. They want the league to be as attractive as possible, with the best chance for the highest ratings on national and local levels. They do not want the Big 12 to lose any of the Big Three: Texas, Oklahoma, and A&M. They would be happy if Snow White and the Nine Dwarfs remains the story of the Big 12 for as long as their contracts run.
Unfortunately, they also have to perform pre-emptive strikes to keep the other major brand schools in the conference content and not escaping to the Big 10, Pac-12, or SEC. That means the Longhorn Network will probably not be airing high school football games. Even if Texas Coach Mack Brown sees no advantage for Texas recruiting in them.
Prophetically enough, Big 12 television specialist Joel Lulla said the following in June of 2010: "We didn't think we were being played by Texas because we were getting a lot of encouraging signs from Austin." Mr. Lulla is either incredibly stupid or incredibly naive. Note to Lulla and the rest of the Big 12 conference members: you were and still are being played.
As this wraps up, news from the West Coast indicates that the Pac-12 will be creating its own national conference network and several regional conference networks to debut in August of 2012 on local cable carriers such as Cox, Comcast, and Time-Warner. One would imagine that those revenues would be equitably shared as well, following the Big 10 and not the Big 12 model.
Thanks to Wendell Barnhouse at Big12Sports.com for much of the information contained herein.
Thursday, July 28, 2011
Friday, July 22, 2011
The NBA Lockout Continues: A Question of Entitlement
As various NBA stars play exhibitions and sniff out contracts overseas for the 2011-2012 season, leave it to a Laker to come out and say what makes people hate the Lakers specifically and the NBA in general. First, he tries to portray NBA players as sympathetic underdogs against the evil all-powerful NBA owners. Ironically, he tries to portray the owners as the group with a sense of entitlement.
Reality check. The last time I looked, the players were the ones strutting their sense of entitlement. For example, I think of Carlos Boozer at Utah. He would sit out games, entire weeks, for hangnails and stomach aches. He would delay treatments and surgeries for legitimate medical issues. Then again, Carlos had a long-term, guaranteed contract. Then again, he had a nice wardrobe of designer suits which he wore sitting behind the bench or at the end of the bench while his team suffered through his absences.
For example, I think of Ralph Sampson, getting paid millions by the Kings for years after his medically-induced early retirement. For example, I think of Pervis Ellison, an NCAA tournament star who quickly became an NBA malingerer for the same Kings.
The ugliest example of player entitlement occurred this week when Laker center Andrew Bynum was caught on camera hogging a handicapped parking space with his pimped out vehicle. No doubt, he parked there because he felt he deserved the short walk and no-ding assurance of that very wide space.
Yesterday, Derek Fisher, ancient point guard of the Lakers, spouted off about never signing off on a new collective bargaining agreement that included a cessation or reduction of guaranteed, long-term contracts. His new disingenuous argument? The NBA game's integrity would be damaged! Why? Players would have to play selfishly and become gunners to boost their stats so they could ink the best deals for themselves on an annual basis.
One could argue the game's integrity is already hanging by a perilous thread, what with questionable officiating, coaches having to play second fiddle to prima donna star players (see Jerry Sloan and Deron Williams last season in Utah), and trades meant to keep the big-market teams long into the playoff season.
One could even argue that the game's integrity is most threatened by those guaranteed, long-term contracts that Mr. Fisher is so impassioned to save. After all, fans pay hard-earned cash for seats, and they deserve more than players sleepwalking through half a season four years from their contract's end.
Addressing Mr. Fisher's theory, he is undermining player integrity, essentially admitting that all players are in it for themselves, not the team. They come first, second, and last. I believe D-Fish is wrong here. Some players do care and play for the team, not themselves (see San Antonio and Dallas and Boston). Some players do play hard every minute and every game (see Kobe Bryant).
Mr. Fisher is also simplifying matters. Not all players would become gunners, trying to boost their points per game average. Rebounders would be fighting for rebounds. Shot-blockers would be blocking shots. Point guards would be making more assists. Players would be fighting to be more efficient players in their specialties. Is that such a bad thing? It's called effort.
D-Fish, take note: owners, general managers, and coaches remember who makes a team perform better and who makes a team perform worse while they are on the court. In the NBA, there is no place for a player to hide. In 2010-2011, the average NBA salary was $5.8 million. We're not talking the Tim Duncans, Dwight Howards, Kobe Bryants, and Dwyane Wades who deserve superstar status and put fannies in the seats. We're talking the Luke Waltons (about $5.9 million for 9 minutes a game) and Derek Fishers (about $3.4 million for diminishing statistics and playing time at almost age 37).
It's curious why Mr. Fisher is president of the NBAPA in the first place, when his own track record makes one question his own integrity. After all, he bolted the Lakers once before. Then, he bolted the Utah Jazz under questionable circumstances, using the sympathy card of his daughter's medical issues when all he really wanted to do was rejoin Kobe and the Lakers and grab a few more championship rings. Mr. Fisher is also opposed to the amnesty clause established in the 2005 CBA because he could be the player singled out for it by the Lakers in 2011. At least he's consistent where self-interest is concerned.
In conclusion, we already know the players won't budge on the issues (a hard salary cap, a 33% reduction in salaries, the end of long-term guaranteed contracts) the owners are pressing for until it's guaranteed that training camp and the preseason schedule are eliminated. Then, the owners will be ready for a long lockout/stalemate. Personally, I'll be happy to see Deron Williams board a plane for Turkey. I hope he stays there.
Reality check. The last time I looked, the players were the ones strutting their sense of entitlement. For example, I think of Carlos Boozer at Utah. He would sit out games, entire weeks, for hangnails and stomach aches. He would delay treatments and surgeries for legitimate medical issues. Then again, Carlos had a long-term, guaranteed contract. Then again, he had a nice wardrobe of designer suits which he wore sitting behind the bench or at the end of the bench while his team suffered through his absences.
For example, I think of Ralph Sampson, getting paid millions by the Kings for years after his medically-induced early retirement. For example, I think of Pervis Ellison, an NCAA tournament star who quickly became an NBA malingerer for the same Kings.
The ugliest example of player entitlement occurred this week when Laker center Andrew Bynum was caught on camera hogging a handicapped parking space with his pimped out vehicle. No doubt, he parked there because he felt he deserved the short walk and no-ding assurance of that very wide space.
Yesterday, Derek Fisher, ancient point guard of the Lakers, spouted off about never signing off on a new collective bargaining agreement that included a cessation or reduction of guaranteed, long-term contracts. His new disingenuous argument? The NBA game's integrity would be damaged! Why? Players would have to play selfishly and become gunners to boost their stats so they could ink the best deals for themselves on an annual basis.
One could argue the game's integrity is already hanging by a perilous thread, what with questionable officiating, coaches having to play second fiddle to prima donna star players (see Jerry Sloan and Deron Williams last season in Utah), and trades meant to keep the big-market teams long into the playoff season.
One could even argue that the game's integrity is most threatened by those guaranteed, long-term contracts that Mr. Fisher is so impassioned to save. After all, fans pay hard-earned cash for seats, and they deserve more than players sleepwalking through half a season four years from their contract's end.
Addressing Mr. Fisher's theory, he is undermining player integrity, essentially admitting that all players are in it for themselves, not the team. They come first, second, and last. I believe D-Fish is wrong here. Some players do care and play for the team, not themselves (see San Antonio and Dallas and Boston). Some players do play hard every minute and every game (see Kobe Bryant).
Mr. Fisher is also simplifying matters. Not all players would become gunners, trying to boost their points per game average. Rebounders would be fighting for rebounds. Shot-blockers would be blocking shots. Point guards would be making more assists. Players would be fighting to be more efficient players in their specialties. Is that such a bad thing? It's called effort.
D-Fish, take note: owners, general managers, and coaches remember who makes a team perform better and who makes a team perform worse while they are on the court. In the NBA, there is no place for a player to hide. In 2010-2011, the average NBA salary was $5.8 million. We're not talking the Tim Duncans, Dwight Howards, Kobe Bryants, and Dwyane Wades who deserve superstar status and put fannies in the seats. We're talking the Luke Waltons (about $5.9 million for 9 minutes a game) and Derek Fishers (about $3.4 million for diminishing statistics and playing time at almost age 37).
It's curious why Mr. Fisher is president of the NBAPA in the first place, when his own track record makes one question his own integrity. After all, he bolted the Lakers once before. Then, he bolted the Utah Jazz under questionable circumstances, using the sympathy card of his daughter's medical issues when all he really wanted to do was rejoin Kobe and the Lakers and grab a few more championship rings. Mr. Fisher is also opposed to the amnesty clause established in the 2005 CBA because he could be the player singled out for it by the Lakers in 2011. At least he's consistent where self-interest is concerned.
In conclusion, we already know the players won't budge on the issues (a hard salary cap, a 33% reduction in salaries, the end of long-term guaranteed contracts) the owners are pressing for until it's guaranteed that training camp and the preseason schedule are eliminated. Then, the owners will be ready for a long lockout/stalemate. Personally, I'll be happy to see Deron Williams board a plane for Turkey. I hope he stays there.
Thursday, July 21, 2011
The 2011 British Open: The Yanks Are Coming! The Yanks Are Coming!
There were many big storylines found at Sandwich, England last week during the 2011 British Open. By the end of the tournament, that number had shrunk significantly. Amateur Tom Lewis of the U.K. had a share of the lead after the first day, then faltered. However, he made the cut and finished as the top amateur, no small honor, at +9.
Two of the big favorites, and among my favorites, were Luke Donald and Lee Westwood. They responded to the pressure by wilting in the rain flurries and blowing wind, failing to make the cut.
Remarkably, several Americans showed good form all four days--that was the second biggest story. Some biased commentators kept referring to the choke job performed by Phil Mickelson and Dustin Johnson. Are you kidding me? Two problems with that. First, the biggest story, Darren Clarke, gobbled up the course in all conditions, earning the victory with the best tee-to-green performance. If he had made more putts, he would have won by at least eight shots. You could call some of his misses "choke jobs," too.
As for Mickelson and Johnson, give them credit for being in contention on Sunday. It's impossible to win a major without putting yourself in contention on Sunday. Mickelson had played three steady days leading to Sunday, where he was six under after ten holes! That's not choking. Did he miss an easy putt on eleven? Yes. Was he wayward with a few drives on the final seven holes? Yes. Did he miss a few more makeable putts? Yes. Did he land one in the bleachers beside the green? Yes. Does everybody do it? Yes.
Commentators Curtis Strange and Paul Azinger were particularly harsh on Johnson, since they had fingered him as the "obvious" favorite on Sunday. They could not understand how a man of Johnson's skill could drive a ball out of bounds on the 14th hole. Ridiculous! Johnson and Mickelson wound up tied for second place, three shots behind Clarke. To finish second at a British Open under such difficult conditions is a huge accomplishment, especially if you're a so-called "soft" American.
Finishing second at a major is no crime, and it certainly is no choke. Jack Nicklaus ,who may be best known for winning 18 majors and being the greatest golfer of all time, also finished second or tied for second in 17 other majors. Who would call Nicklaus a choke artist? Some weeks you win it all; some weeks you don't. Both Mickelson and Johnson put themselves in a good place for Sunday's final round. That's all you can ask for.
Meanwhile, Darren Clarke was criticized by the same American ESPN commentators for shifting his eyes during putting. They made it sound like he had Marty Feldman or Jack Elam eyes and thus would be handicapped down the stretch. Clarke missed a few, but he made more putts than he missed on Sunday. Everybody has a different putting style. Get used to it.
I give Clarke credit for not crying when prompted to by interviewers after the round. Yes, he lost his wife to cancer in 2006. Yes, a once-talented golfer had been given up for dead by the elite competition until this year. Yes, he was known more for being a heavy drinker, good-hearted soul, and Ferrari hobbyist than a seriously competing golfer in 2010. Yet, Clarke didn't crow or boast. He also didn't do a phony "aw-shucks" routine and wallow in bathos in an act of pandering for endorsements. Darren Clarke is a man.
Other Americans who had a fine week at Royal St. George's included youngsters Rickie Fowler and Anthony Kim, midsters Chad Campbell and Lucas Glover, and old veterans Davis Love III and Steve Stricker. Of the eight Americans who finished in the top 12, only Stricker was chosen by me to finish in the top 20.
Best of all (and I'm truly glad my predictions were wrong), Americans like Mickelson, Fowler, and Love were yukking it up at day's end, genuinely happy for Darren Clarke. In contrast, former golf poster boy of the summer, Northern Ireland's Rory McIlroy, complained about the weather and the course while splitting with his longtime girlfriend to "celebrity upgrade" to a women's tennis champion. It's nice to see somebody besides an American with a prominent character issue! Tables turned!
Two of the big favorites, and among my favorites, were Luke Donald and Lee Westwood. They responded to the pressure by wilting in the rain flurries and blowing wind, failing to make the cut.
Remarkably, several Americans showed good form all four days--that was the second biggest story. Some biased commentators kept referring to the choke job performed by Phil Mickelson and Dustin Johnson. Are you kidding me? Two problems with that. First, the biggest story, Darren Clarke, gobbled up the course in all conditions, earning the victory with the best tee-to-green performance. If he had made more putts, he would have won by at least eight shots. You could call some of his misses "choke jobs," too.
As for Mickelson and Johnson, give them credit for being in contention on Sunday. It's impossible to win a major without putting yourself in contention on Sunday. Mickelson had played three steady days leading to Sunday, where he was six under after ten holes! That's not choking. Did he miss an easy putt on eleven? Yes. Was he wayward with a few drives on the final seven holes? Yes. Did he miss a few more makeable putts? Yes. Did he land one in the bleachers beside the green? Yes. Does everybody do it? Yes.
Commentators Curtis Strange and Paul Azinger were particularly harsh on Johnson, since they had fingered him as the "obvious" favorite on Sunday. They could not understand how a man of Johnson's skill could drive a ball out of bounds on the 14th hole. Ridiculous! Johnson and Mickelson wound up tied for second place, three shots behind Clarke. To finish second at a British Open under such difficult conditions is a huge accomplishment, especially if you're a so-called "soft" American.
Finishing second at a major is no crime, and it certainly is no choke. Jack Nicklaus ,who may be best known for winning 18 majors and being the greatest golfer of all time, also finished second or tied for second in 17 other majors. Who would call Nicklaus a choke artist? Some weeks you win it all; some weeks you don't. Both Mickelson and Johnson put themselves in a good place for Sunday's final round. That's all you can ask for.
Meanwhile, Darren Clarke was criticized by the same American ESPN commentators for shifting his eyes during putting. They made it sound like he had Marty Feldman or Jack Elam eyes and thus would be handicapped down the stretch. Clarke missed a few, but he made more putts than he missed on Sunday. Everybody has a different putting style. Get used to it.
I give Clarke credit for not crying when prompted to by interviewers after the round. Yes, he lost his wife to cancer in 2006. Yes, a once-talented golfer had been given up for dead by the elite competition until this year. Yes, he was known more for being a heavy drinker, good-hearted soul, and Ferrari hobbyist than a seriously competing golfer in 2010. Yet, Clarke didn't crow or boast. He also didn't do a phony "aw-shucks" routine and wallow in bathos in an act of pandering for endorsements. Darren Clarke is a man.
Other Americans who had a fine week at Royal St. George's included youngsters Rickie Fowler and Anthony Kim, midsters Chad Campbell and Lucas Glover, and old veterans Davis Love III and Steve Stricker. Of the eight Americans who finished in the top 12, only Stricker was chosen by me to finish in the top 20.
Best of all (and I'm truly glad my predictions were wrong), Americans like Mickelson, Fowler, and Love were yukking it up at day's end, genuinely happy for Darren Clarke. In contrast, former golf poster boy of the summer, Northern Ireland's Rory McIlroy, complained about the weather and the course while splitting with his longtime girlfriend to "celebrity upgrade" to a women's tennis champion. It's nice to see somebody besides an American with a prominent character issue! Tables turned!
Thursday, July 14, 2011
2011 British Open: Top 20 Favorites
The third major of the golf season is upon us, and it's time to thank ESPN for its extensive coverage of the event. Golf remains a terrific game, a game unhindered by free agency, revenue sharing, or long-term guaranteed contracts. If players miss the cut, they miss the cut. If they lose their tour cards, they lose their tour cards. No lawyer or agent can save them. Golf has no problem with competitive parity. With Tiger Woods on the decline, temporarily at least, anybody can win. However, some can win easier than others. Predictions for the top twenty finishers at Royal St. George's follow.
First, Americans will be troubled as usual by the howling winds, intermittent rains, cavernous bunkers, and rolling fairways. I give Phil Mickelson and Bubba Watson credit for just showing up. John Daly will be happy that he's golfing in a town called Sandwich. Well, he'll be golfing for two days, anyway. Americans who should score better include Nick Watney, Stewart Cink, Steve Stricker, and the ageless Tom Watson.
Who will finish in positions six to twenty? In no particular order, here are the names as this reporter sees it: Paul Casey, Justin Rose, Martin Kaymer, Padraig Harrington, Adam Scott, Geoff Ogilvy, Charl Schwartzel, Angel Cabrera, Sergio Garcia, Retief Goosen, Louis Oosthuizen, Ian Poulter, Steve Stricker, Ernie Els, and Bernhard Langer (top finisher of the over-50 set).
Who will finish in the top five? A longshot could get hot for four consecutive days and surprise everybody. It has happened at other majors recently. However, this reporter views the names Lee Westwood, Jason Day, Luke Donald, Graeme McDowell, and Rory McIlroy as those most likely to succeed on the links course. Unfortunately, no American made that shortest of short lists. One can only hope that the prediction is wrong.
Enjoy the tournament!
First, Americans will be troubled as usual by the howling winds, intermittent rains, cavernous bunkers, and rolling fairways. I give Phil Mickelson and Bubba Watson credit for just showing up. John Daly will be happy that he's golfing in a town called Sandwich. Well, he'll be golfing for two days, anyway. Americans who should score better include Nick Watney, Stewart Cink, Steve Stricker, and the ageless Tom Watson.
Who will finish in positions six to twenty? In no particular order, here are the names as this reporter sees it: Paul Casey, Justin Rose, Martin Kaymer, Padraig Harrington, Adam Scott, Geoff Ogilvy, Charl Schwartzel, Angel Cabrera, Sergio Garcia, Retief Goosen, Louis Oosthuizen, Ian Poulter, Steve Stricker, Ernie Els, and Bernhard Langer (top finisher of the over-50 set).
Who will finish in the top five? A longshot could get hot for four consecutive days and surprise everybody. It has happened at other majors recently. However, this reporter views the names Lee Westwood, Jason Day, Luke Donald, Graeme McDowell, and Rory McIlroy as those most likely to succeed on the links course. Unfortunately, no American made that shortest of short lists. One can only hope that the prediction is wrong.
Enjoy the tournament!
Major League Baseball: Obscuring the Major Issues
Major League Baseball has always been good at setting smokescreens while ducking the major issues. The latest example is last night's All-Star Game in Arizona. According to MLB, the major issue was the selection process of game participants and contest competitors, with special criticism reserved for SF Giants/NL manager Bruce Bochey infesting his roster with undeserving Giants like Tim Lincecum, and Prince Fielder for choosing a pal for the Home Run Derby over a far more deserving Arizona Diamondback. To anybody with a remote semblence of intelligence, the real issue was the voluntary absences of several stars like Derek Jeter, Mariano Rivera, and C.C. Sabathia, who claimed they needed rest.
Some player apologists would argue that the 162-game season is grueling, and players deserve a 3-day break midseason. Still others would argue that the players were making a covert protest against Arizona's recent anti-immigrant legislation by refusing to play at Chase Field. Are you kidding?
Some stars sat out for a very good reason: they have the power and they know it. Express gratitude to the game and fans that made them rich? Forget it. Why not grab a 3-day holiday in Las Vegas or Florida? There is no punishment for no-shows at the All-Star Game. There should be. No wonder fan disillusionment grows by the day as players like Jeter (ironically considered one of the good guys) and Alex Rodriguez flex their power by giving fans, networks, and even their own teams the finger by sitting out.
How could Jeter's absence hurt his own Yankees team? Doesn't three days of rest help Jeter's health for the second half of the season? Maybe, but his All-Star absence gave the American League team one less potent bat in the line-up. The American League lost 5-1 last night. As a result, due to the 2003 policy change, the winning league gets home-field advantage in the World Series. If the Yankees make the World Series in 2011, they would not have home-field advantage. This could definitely detrimentally impact the team. Superstar arrogance and power continues unabated in Major League Baseball.
Now it's time to turn to more important issues impacting baseball. Belatedly, MLB focuses on the "steroids" era, citing it as the biggest blemish on its sport. Really? All major sports have "problems" with performance-enhancing drugs. There have always been and there will always be individual cheaters looking for competitive advantages when the stakes are so high. As testing becomes more refined, so does the ability of cheaters to mask the performance-enhancing drugs they use. Ask Lance Armstrong.
Anabolic steroids have been around since the 1940's. Schwarzenegger and others were winning juiced Mr. Olympia titles in the 1960's. Now we're supposed to believe that steroids have only been in baseball since the '90s? Really? Even Jose Canseco is proof that they were alive and well in the 1980's. "Steroid" era? Laughable.
Picking on sluggers like Barry Bonds is ridiculous when pitchers like Roger Clemens and Andy Pettit were also using similar drugs. The press likes to persecute Bonds because he didn't like to spend three hours after games answering the same 3 questions.
What Bud Selig and MLB does not focus on are the other reasons for the "Steroids" Era inflated statistics. Can anybody spell "juiced ball"? Can anybody spell "smaller park dimensions"? Can anybody spell "over-expansion leading to diluted quality of pitching talent"? After the crippling strike of 1994, baseball needed a quick boost in popularity. The easiest way to return fannies to the seats, eyes to the televisions, and headlines to media print publications and broadcast shows was to create superhero sluggers. This was done.
In that respect, baseball was borrowing a page from its own illustrious history. In 1919, after the Chicago White Sox scandal showed fans that some players had thrown the World Series in order to receive payments from gamblers, the game was in crisis. Public confidence was shaken. If the games were a sham, nobody would attend. What did baseball do? They entered the live ball era and started promoting sluggers over pitchers. Offensive statistics soared in the 1920's, led by Babe Ruth, Jimmie Foxx, and Lou Gehrig. What else did baseball do? They made sure the biggest and best talent and teams wound up in the media and advertising capital: New York.
One could argue that New York still retains a preponderance of the talent, not due to lopsided trades as in the Ruth era, but due to free agency.
With steroid investigations as the smokescreen, MLB continues to skirt around the main issues demolishing its popularity: revenue sharing, minimum salaries, free agency, and long-term, guaranteed contracts.
First, revenue sharing. Major League Baseball does not share nearly as much of the total pot as the NFL does. Before 2006, very little was shared, leading to dynasties by major-market, highly-capitalized teams like the Red Sox and Yankees. In 2007, revenue sharing of 34% of local revenue streams occurred for the first time. Approximately $312 million was transferred from high to low revenue teams that year. In 2009, $433 million was transferred. In 2010, $404 million was transferred. Meanwhile, total revenues went from $6.8 billion in 2009 to $7 billion in 2010.
Big market teams rightfully argue that not all small-market teams use their revenue sharing windfall for payroll and other team improvements. They actually profit more by remaining a low-revenue team and taking subsequent revenue sharing bonuses. The system is far from perfect. Not only should the percentage of local revenue streams be upped to at least 80% for revenue sharing, but all teams (high and low revenue alike) should be monitored and held to a competitive standard in salaries for players, coaches, managers, and scouting systems. That would avoid the possibilities of enduring a future Frank McCourt scenario, the irresponsible Dodger owner who has a propensity for sinking his team revenue into personal mansions, planes, parties, and salaries for children, leaving him barely able to meet payroll and cutting valuable security personnel.
The next major issue affecting the popularity and health of Major League Baseball is the standard minimum salary. In 1966, the average major league salary was $16,000 with a minimum of $6,000. Non-stars had off-season jobs to supplement their player salaries. They were real people with real problems that real fans could identify with. By 1973, the average had jumped to $36,500, thanks to the MLBPA's Marvin Miller and arbitration. This was still reasonable. Stars have always deserved more. They are fan magnets.
But what about a .220 career average second baseman earning six figures? That occurred in the 1980's. Then it truly became crazy. While big-market teams could afford the increases, small-market teams were left behind.
By 2006, the standard minimum major league salary had risen to $327,000. A strike was averted in 2007 by owners and players agreeing to another five-year CBA that boosted the minimum to $380,000 in 2007. The owners were gutless and spineless wonders. Such pre-emptive caving has led to players like Jeter telling the league what to do and what he is going to do during All-Star breaks.
In 2011, the standard minimum reached $414,000, a $14,000 increase over 2010. Why? The 2006 CBA allows for a salary to keep pace with the annual rise of the Consumer Price Index, aka inflation. It's tough to live on only $400,000, live on it and hit a robust .210. Even minor league players now earn a $65,000 minimum.
Solution? Reduce minimum salaries to less than $80,000. Why? So players are more motivated to hit, field, and pitch better (to become highly paid stars) and fans are motivated to attend games. The dog days of summer are more aptly called the dogging-it days of summer when referring to major league baseball.
The next big issue is free agency. Naturally, all of the big issues are inter-related. They all adversely affect small-market teams, making them little more than farm teams of the big-market, high-revenue teams.
The once proud Athletics and Padres can no longer afford to retain their stars and future stars. This is unfortunate, for both teams have excellent farm systems of their own, and should be rewarded for identifying and developing talent. If minimum salaries were lower, low-revenue teams could afford to retain at least one star under a franchise tag (if only). If there were a more complete revenue sharing policy, there would be greater competitive parity as well. If there weren't unlimited free agency, small-market teams wouldn't lose their best players every other year and have to start over again.
Where did free agency come from? It came from Marvin Miller, arbitration, ignorance, and press sympathy. However, the catalyst was Curt Flood, a star outfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals who didn't appreciate being traded to the Philadelphia Phillies for the 1970 season.
Instead of reporting, Flood sued Major League Baseball, calling the Reserve Clause unconstitutional and akin to slavery-even though players of all races and ethnicities were treated equally and Flood was getting paid $90,000, a decent salary for 1970. The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court, where in 1972 Flood lost, the Reserve Clause was retained, but the groundwork was laid.
The first of eight work stoppages in baseball occurred in the spring of 1972. Players, propped up by the sympathetic press, were feeling it. The new CBA gave them expanded medical coverage, and the first opportunity to have salaries equate with market value. Independent arbitrators were now determining salaries, not the owners.
In 1975, Dave McNally and Andy Messerschmitt did not sign their contracts, making the season technically their option years. While McNally retired, Messerschmitt went on to challenge MLB policy, the Reserve Clause. True free agency was born. Before the 1976 season, teams went crazy for great talent no longer tied down to one team for life unless traded or released. The Athletics saw their great empire vanish, with one star, Joe Rudi, going to the Angels and another, Reggie Jackson, going to the Yankees. Big-market, high-revenue teams became cherry pickers, picking the best talent from smaller teams. Players now were only tied to their first team for the first six years. After that, they could file for free agency.
As a result of free agency, long-term, guaranteed contracts became the norm for superstars, further widening the gap between the haves and have-nots. Why? A small-market team may be able to afford to sign its star at $20 million for two years, but the big-market team could sign them at $20 million for five or six years. Guaranteed. Disabling injury or not. Baseball became like horse racing: high-risk ventures of signing talent and hoping it would stay healthy. Such long-term contracts unraveled mid-market and small-market teams when they were able to beat the bigs in the open market, but then saw players fall apart or lack discipline and drive and become underachievers until the contract year. This further dilution of talent caused by such contracts also led to fan displeasure. It helped football become number one in popularity, for football didn't have such ridiculous agreements with its players.
How ridiculous? Before the 2001 season, the Texas Rangers signed Alex Rodriguez to a 10-year, $250 million contract. Rodriguez delivered the stats, but his contract made the mid-market Rangers incapable of fielding a competitive team. The Rangers remained losers, causing them to trade A-Rod to the Yankees after a few years to leave room on their payroll for more quality players. If they weren't superstars with superegos before, they were after the A-Rod signing. I'm not talking about baseball players now; I'm talking about the agents. Men like Scott Boras became too important in the sport.
How ridiculous? The Giants signed Barry Zito to a seven-year, $126 million contract a few years back. He was so effective, whether injured or not, that the Giants did not put him on the post-season roster for 2010. He is, at best, the fifth starter on an excellent staff. Only recently has he shown signs of a winning streak.
How ridiculous? The Cubs signed Alfonso Soriano to an eight-year, $136 million contract, with awful results so far. The Rockies signed Mike Hampton to an eight-year, $121 million contract. Hampton won 56 games over that span, with as high an e.r.a. on the road as at home in hitter-friendly Coors Field.
How ridiculous? As was pointed out recently, the Dodgers still owe Manny Ramirez over $30 million on his contract, although Manny is far from Chavez Ravine. Kevin Brown and Vernon Wells were other Dodgers missteps. Back to the present, the Mets have a bad deal in Oliver Perez (3-year, $36 million) and the Red Sox have a worse deal in John Lackey (5-year, $80 million). Even the Yankees were royally burned on the A.J. Burnett deal, worth about $16.5 million annually.
What is the solution? First, eliminate guarantees. If a player get seriously injured or chronically underperforms, a team should have the right to release him without further fiscal obligation. Second, limit contracts to two years with an option for a third maximum. That should prevent less motivated players from dogging it for entire years, yet it's still better than what players had prior to 1976: one-year contracts with an option for a second.
Baseball remains the greatest game on the planet.Any team game that does not rely upon a clock is perfect for leisure, the opposite of business. In early 1942, after America's entry into World War Two, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt made a quick decision to have Major League Baseball continue, saying, "Americans will need a chance for recreation and for taking their minds off their work even more than before."
Unfortunately, the labor strife and squabbles and strikes of the past forty years in baseball make Americans view the game as a reflection of work rather than an escape from it. Unfortunately, players went from having no control to having too much, as witnessed by the absence of Sabathia, Rivera, and Jeter from the 2011 All-Star Game. Too bad.
The Yankees boast the biggest payroll in baseball: well over $200 million. However, revenue is so high that they are willing to pay a luxury tax (which kicks in when the payroll exceeds $178 million). In 2008, the Yankees paid $21.6 million as their penalty. Meanwhile, teams like the Marlins and their $37 million payroll never need to worry about a luxury tax.
In closing, Major League Baseball has major problems. The business loves using smokescreens to obscure those problems. With $7 billion in total revenue in 2010, the game is not in danger of disappearing anytime soon. Yet, how long will small-market and mismanaged mid-market teams survive in this depressed economy? Why should they survive if their only role is to provide talent to the big-market, high-revenue teams?
Some player apologists would argue that the 162-game season is grueling, and players deserve a 3-day break midseason. Still others would argue that the players were making a covert protest against Arizona's recent anti-immigrant legislation by refusing to play at Chase Field. Are you kidding?
Some stars sat out for a very good reason: they have the power and they know it. Express gratitude to the game and fans that made them rich? Forget it. Why not grab a 3-day holiday in Las Vegas or Florida? There is no punishment for no-shows at the All-Star Game. There should be. No wonder fan disillusionment grows by the day as players like Jeter (ironically considered one of the good guys) and Alex Rodriguez flex their power by giving fans, networks, and even their own teams the finger by sitting out.
How could Jeter's absence hurt his own Yankees team? Doesn't three days of rest help Jeter's health for the second half of the season? Maybe, but his All-Star absence gave the American League team one less potent bat in the line-up. The American League lost 5-1 last night. As a result, due to the 2003 policy change, the winning league gets home-field advantage in the World Series. If the Yankees make the World Series in 2011, they would not have home-field advantage. This could definitely detrimentally impact the team. Superstar arrogance and power continues unabated in Major League Baseball.
Now it's time to turn to more important issues impacting baseball. Belatedly, MLB focuses on the "steroids" era, citing it as the biggest blemish on its sport. Really? All major sports have "problems" with performance-enhancing drugs. There have always been and there will always be individual cheaters looking for competitive advantages when the stakes are so high. As testing becomes more refined, so does the ability of cheaters to mask the performance-enhancing drugs they use. Ask Lance Armstrong.
Anabolic steroids have been around since the 1940's. Schwarzenegger and others were winning juiced Mr. Olympia titles in the 1960's. Now we're supposed to believe that steroids have only been in baseball since the '90s? Really? Even Jose Canseco is proof that they were alive and well in the 1980's. "Steroid" era? Laughable.
Picking on sluggers like Barry Bonds is ridiculous when pitchers like Roger Clemens and Andy Pettit were also using similar drugs. The press likes to persecute Bonds because he didn't like to spend three hours after games answering the same 3 questions.
What Bud Selig and MLB does not focus on are the other reasons for the "Steroids" Era inflated statistics. Can anybody spell "juiced ball"? Can anybody spell "smaller park dimensions"? Can anybody spell "over-expansion leading to diluted quality of pitching talent"? After the crippling strike of 1994, baseball needed a quick boost in popularity. The easiest way to return fannies to the seats, eyes to the televisions, and headlines to media print publications and broadcast shows was to create superhero sluggers. This was done.
In that respect, baseball was borrowing a page from its own illustrious history. In 1919, after the Chicago White Sox scandal showed fans that some players had thrown the World Series in order to receive payments from gamblers, the game was in crisis. Public confidence was shaken. If the games were a sham, nobody would attend. What did baseball do? They entered the live ball era and started promoting sluggers over pitchers. Offensive statistics soared in the 1920's, led by Babe Ruth, Jimmie Foxx, and Lou Gehrig. What else did baseball do? They made sure the biggest and best talent and teams wound up in the media and advertising capital: New York.
One could argue that New York still retains a preponderance of the talent, not due to lopsided trades as in the Ruth era, but due to free agency.
With steroid investigations as the smokescreen, MLB continues to skirt around the main issues demolishing its popularity: revenue sharing, minimum salaries, free agency, and long-term, guaranteed contracts.
First, revenue sharing. Major League Baseball does not share nearly as much of the total pot as the NFL does. Before 2006, very little was shared, leading to dynasties by major-market, highly-capitalized teams like the Red Sox and Yankees. In 2007, revenue sharing of 34% of local revenue streams occurred for the first time. Approximately $312 million was transferred from high to low revenue teams that year. In 2009, $433 million was transferred. In 2010, $404 million was transferred. Meanwhile, total revenues went from $6.8 billion in 2009 to $7 billion in 2010.
Big market teams rightfully argue that not all small-market teams use their revenue sharing windfall for payroll and other team improvements. They actually profit more by remaining a low-revenue team and taking subsequent revenue sharing bonuses. The system is far from perfect. Not only should the percentage of local revenue streams be upped to at least 80% for revenue sharing, but all teams (high and low revenue alike) should be monitored and held to a competitive standard in salaries for players, coaches, managers, and scouting systems. That would avoid the possibilities of enduring a future Frank McCourt scenario, the irresponsible Dodger owner who has a propensity for sinking his team revenue into personal mansions, planes, parties, and salaries for children, leaving him barely able to meet payroll and cutting valuable security personnel.
The next major issue affecting the popularity and health of Major League Baseball is the standard minimum salary. In 1966, the average major league salary was $16,000 with a minimum of $6,000. Non-stars had off-season jobs to supplement their player salaries. They were real people with real problems that real fans could identify with. By 1973, the average had jumped to $36,500, thanks to the MLBPA's Marvin Miller and arbitration. This was still reasonable. Stars have always deserved more. They are fan magnets.
But what about a .220 career average second baseman earning six figures? That occurred in the 1980's. Then it truly became crazy. While big-market teams could afford the increases, small-market teams were left behind.
By 2006, the standard minimum major league salary had risen to $327,000. A strike was averted in 2007 by owners and players agreeing to another five-year CBA that boosted the minimum to $380,000 in 2007. The owners were gutless and spineless wonders. Such pre-emptive caving has led to players like Jeter telling the league what to do and what he is going to do during All-Star breaks.
In 2011, the standard minimum reached $414,000, a $14,000 increase over 2010. Why? The 2006 CBA allows for a salary to keep pace with the annual rise of the Consumer Price Index, aka inflation. It's tough to live on only $400,000, live on it and hit a robust .210. Even minor league players now earn a $65,000 minimum.
Solution? Reduce minimum salaries to less than $80,000. Why? So players are more motivated to hit, field, and pitch better (to become highly paid stars) and fans are motivated to attend games. The dog days of summer are more aptly called the dogging-it days of summer when referring to major league baseball.
The next big issue is free agency. Naturally, all of the big issues are inter-related. They all adversely affect small-market teams, making them little more than farm teams of the big-market, high-revenue teams.
The once proud Athletics and Padres can no longer afford to retain their stars and future stars. This is unfortunate, for both teams have excellent farm systems of their own, and should be rewarded for identifying and developing talent. If minimum salaries were lower, low-revenue teams could afford to retain at least one star under a franchise tag (if only). If there were a more complete revenue sharing policy, there would be greater competitive parity as well. If there weren't unlimited free agency, small-market teams wouldn't lose their best players every other year and have to start over again.
Where did free agency come from? It came from Marvin Miller, arbitration, ignorance, and press sympathy. However, the catalyst was Curt Flood, a star outfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals who didn't appreciate being traded to the Philadelphia Phillies for the 1970 season.
Instead of reporting, Flood sued Major League Baseball, calling the Reserve Clause unconstitutional and akin to slavery-even though players of all races and ethnicities were treated equally and Flood was getting paid $90,000, a decent salary for 1970. The case went to the U.S. Supreme Court, where in 1972 Flood lost, the Reserve Clause was retained, but the groundwork was laid.
The first of eight work stoppages in baseball occurred in the spring of 1972. Players, propped up by the sympathetic press, were feeling it. The new CBA gave them expanded medical coverage, and the first opportunity to have salaries equate with market value. Independent arbitrators were now determining salaries, not the owners.
In 1975, Dave McNally and Andy Messerschmitt did not sign their contracts, making the season technically their option years. While McNally retired, Messerschmitt went on to challenge MLB policy, the Reserve Clause. True free agency was born. Before the 1976 season, teams went crazy for great talent no longer tied down to one team for life unless traded or released. The Athletics saw their great empire vanish, with one star, Joe Rudi, going to the Angels and another, Reggie Jackson, going to the Yankees. Big-market, high-revenue teams became cherry pickers, picking the best talent from smaller teams. Players now were only tied to their first team for the first six years. After that, they could file for free agency.
As a result of free agency, long-term, guaranteed contracts became the norm for superstars, further widening the gap between the haves and have-nots. Why? A small-market team may be able to afford to sign its star at $20 million for two years, but the big-market team could sign them at $20 million for five or six years. Guaranteed. Disabling injury or not. Baseball became like horse racing: high-risk ventures of signing talent and hoping it would stay healthy. Such long-term contracts unraveled mid-market and small-market teams when they were able to beat the bigs in the open market, but then saw players fall apart or lack discipline and drive and become underachievers until the contract year. This further dilution of talent caused by such contracts also led to fan displeasure. It helped football become number one in popularity, for football didn't have such ridiculous agreements with its players.
How ridiculous? Before the 2001 season, the Texas Rangers signed Alex Rodriguez to a 10-year, $250 million contract. Rodriguez delivered the stats, but his contract made the mid-market Rangers incapable of fielding a competitive team. The Rangers remained losers, causing them to trade A-Rod to the Yankees after a few years to leave room on their payroll for more quality players. If they weren't superstars with superegos before, they were after the A-Rod signing. I'm not talking about baseball players now; I'm talking about the agents. Men like Scott Boras became too important in the sport.
How ridiculous? The Giants signed Barry Zito to a seven-year, $126 million contract a few years back. He was so effective, whether injured or not, that the Giants did not put him on the post-season roster for 2010. He is, at best, the fifth starter on an excellent staff. Only recently has he shown signs of a winning streak.
How ridiculous? The Cubs signed Alfonso Soriano to an eight-year, $136 million contract, with awful results so far. The Rockies signed Mike Hampton to an eight-year, $121 million contract. Hampton won 56 games over that span, with as high an e.r.a. on the road as at home in hitter-friendly Coors Field.
How ridiculous? As was pointed out recently, the Dodgers still owe Manny Ramirez over $30 million on his contract, although Manny is far from Chavez Ravine. Kevin Brown and Vernon Wells were other Dodgers missteps. Back to the present, the Mets have a bad deal in Oliver Perez (3-year, $36 million) and the Red Sox have a worse deal in John Lackey (5-year, $80 million). Even the Yankees were royally burned on the A.J. Burnett deal, worth about $16.5 million annually.
What is the solution? First, eliminate guarantees. If a player get seriously injured or chronically underperforms, a team should have the right to release him without further fiscal obligation. Second, limit contracts to two years with an option for a third maximum. That should prevent less motivated players from dogging it for entire years, yet it's still better than what players had prior to 1976: one-year contracts with an option for a second.
Baseball remains the greatest game on the planet.Any team game that does not rely upon a clock is perfect for leisure, the opposite of business. In early 1942, after America's entry into World War Two, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt made a quick decision to have Major League Baseball continue, saying, "Americans will need a chance for recreation and for taking their minds off their work even more than before."
Unfortunately, the labor strife and squabbles and strikes of the past forty years in baseball make Americans view the game as a reflection of work rather than an escape from it. Unfortunately, players went from having no control to having too much, as witnessed by the absence of Sabathia, Rivera, and Jeter from the 2011 All-Star Game. Too bad.
The Yankees boast the biggest payroll in baseball: well over $200 million. However, revenue is so high that they are willing to pay a luxury tax (which kicks in when the payroll exceeds $178 million). In 2008, the Yankees paid $21.6 million as their penalty. Meanwhile, teams like the Marlins and their $37 million payroll never need to worry about a luxury tax.
In closing, Major League Baseball has major problems. The business loves using smokescreens to obscure those problems. With $7 billion in total revenue in 2010, the game is not in danger of disappearing anytime soon. Yet, how long will small-market and mismanaged mid-market teams survive in this depressed economy? Why should they survive if their only role is to provide talent to the big-market, high-revenue teams?
Friday, July 1, 2011
The NBA Lockout Begins: Nothing Like the NFL Lockout
The NFL lockout appears to be entering its last days, since both sides (players and owners) have great incentive to complete the deal, a new CBA. The owners will lose close to one billion dollars if the exhibition/preseason games are not played. The league will lose over nine billion dollars if the entire season is lost.
The NFL is the most popular spectator sport in the USA. All 32 NFL teams are flush, thanks in large part to the revenue sharing policy which allows small-market teams not only to be competitive, but to win the Super Bowl (see Green Bay). Due to the sport's popularity, there is no shortage of young talent available in the annual draft, for a high percentage of young athletes play the sport for at least three years in the NFL's farm system: college football.
The NFL lockout should end by July 15. As a goodwill gesture, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell spoke at the NFL rookies' orientation in Florida this week. This year's orientation was sponsored by the NFLPA. The decertified union invited Goodell to speak, and he accepted the offer.
Sure, there is a small group of hard-line owners who would prefer to hold out until the players' buckled, but the group is too small, and cooler heads will prevail. When the pie is so huge, does it really matter if certain concessions are made by each side for the other to save face?
The only troubling development in the NFL labor strife concerns the divisive issue of the franchise tag. Overpaid quarterbacks like Peyton Manning, Tom Brady, and Drew Brees are against franchise labels because it restricts their movement and salary. The superstars want even larger slices of the pie at the expense of midlevel veterans. This selfishness, now exposed, may lead to some missed blocks in the fall. Or not.
The NBA lockout, which started last night, will follow a different scenario. It has to. The underlying economic facts are dissimilar. Sure, the ratings for this year's title series were up. Sure, the table was set by the league for LeBron & Co. to win their first championship, but Dallas stole it in six games, allegedly revealing the integrity of the league. But three things happened. First, LeBron choked. Second, Miami's lack of a strong post presence was exposed by the Mavericks' great Tyson Chandler. Third, Miami's lack of consistent point guard play was exposed by the Mavericks' wiley veteran Jason Kidd and sparkplug-in-short-spurts Jose Barea. A few miraculous three-point bombs from Jason Terry didn't hurt, either. Dirk was Dirk and Wade was Wade.
Ratings were up not to watch a coronation of King James; ratings were up to watch a team most people love to hate and see lose. Could Mavericks' owner Mark Cuban have paid the officiating crew off in a sum that made what was coming from the league/network/major advertisers alliance look like small change? Sure, but to expound upon such a theory would label one as a conspiracy obsessive.
Speaking of losers, 22 of the 30 NBA teams lose money. Owners of the successful franchises want the players to pay for the small-market teams' share of revenue sharing. Smart. The players want the big-market profitable teams to split the profits with the small-market teams to create revenue sharing. The other major issues are average player salary and hard vs. soft salary caps. The owners want the players to give back a massive sum: over one-half billion dollars. The players have offered to compromise, but not nearly enough.
Due to the greed of the few big-market profitable teams that didn't effectuate a truer revenue sharing plan with the last CBA, those owners now do not have the votes to negotiate a quick settlement. For owners of franchises losing money under the current business plan, a lockout is profitable. A lockout means a smaller loss than playing. A majority of owners will sit this one out and wait until major concessions are offered by the players and/or the major-market profitable teams to reduce player salaries, guaranteed salaries, and to boost revenue sharing closer to the NFL model.
The other distinction between the NFL lockout and the NBA lockout concerns their respective drafts. The NFL had a great draft as usual, full of talented, experienced players. The NBA had a lean draft, filled with somewhat talented non-superstars with far less experience for the most part, thanks to the NBA's short-sighted raid-the-NCAA policy of allowing 19-year-olds to be drafted.
Because so many prep superstars are pampered from age 12 on in America, most do not take the time or have the discipline to learn all of the fundamentals. Perhaps that explains why so many international players were drafted this year: most are less athletic than their American counterparts, but they are more coachable and have a better handle on fundamentals.
Nowitzki's success in this year's finals may have also influenced the scouts and GM's. Obviously, nobody was paying attention to Stojakovich's lack of defense and rebounding that led to his benching in the same series, Peja being another player brought up on Euroball.
What was the problem with the NBA draft that has direct repercussions on the labor dispute? There were no Michael Jordans taken by bad teams. There were some players who might turn out to be good NBA journeymen. But no players were taken that should become NBA superstars. That's still a roll of the dice since most drafted, international and domestic, are too young to tell. Therefore, the small-market teams left draft night no closer to a title than when they arrived.
The lowly Sacramento Kings took Jimmer Fredette, an affable sharpshooter and consensus college player of the year. He's athletic like Steve Nash is athletic. He plays defense like Nash plays D. The last time the Kings took a short white guy who made national headlines, his name was Bobby Hurley. How did that turn out? One thing is certain: Fredette's addition has provided some short-term season ticket sales action.
Teams need fannies in the seats more than wins. That should illustrate the desperate times of small-market teams.
In sum, expect the NFL to settle soon. Expect the NBA to keep a lockout for the better part of a year. At least.
The NFL is the most popular spectator sport in the USA. All 32 NFL teams are flush, thanks in large part to the revenue sharing policy which allows small-market teams not only to be competitive, but to win the Super Bowl (see Green Bay). Due to the sport's popularity, there is no shortage of young talent available in the annual draft, for a high percentage of young athletes play the sport for at least three years in the NFL's farm system: college football.
The NFL lockout should end by July 15. As a goodwill gesture, NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell spoke at the NFL rookies' orientation in Florida this week. This year's orientation was sponsored by the NFLPA. The decertified union invited Goodell to speak, and he accepted the offer.
Sure, there is a small group of hard-line owners who would prefer to hold out until the players' buckled, but the group is too small, and cooler heads will prevail. When the pie is so huge, does it really matter if certain concessions are made by each side for the other to save face?
The only troubling development in the NFL labor strife concerns the divisive issue of the franchise tag. Overpaid quarterbacks like Peyton Manning, Tom Brady, and Drew Brees are against franchise labels because it restricts their movement and salary. The superstars want even larger slices of the pie at the expense of midlevel veterans. This selfishness, now exposed, may lead to some missed blocks in the fall. Or not.
The NBA lockout, which started last night, will follow a different scenario. It has to. The underlying economic facts are dissimilar. Sure, the ratings for this year's title series were up. Sure, the table was set by the league for LeBron & Co. to win their first championship, but Dallas stole it in six games, allegedly revealing the integrity of the league. But three things happened. First, LeBron choked. Second, Miami's lack of a strong post presence was exposed by the Mavericks' great Tyson Chandler. Third, Miami's lack of consistent point guard play was exposed by the Mavericks' wiley veteran Jason Kidd and sparkplug-in-short-spurts Jose Barea. A few miraculous three-point bombs from Jason Terry didn't hurt, either. Dirk was Dirk and Wade was Wade.
Ratings were up not to watch a coronation of King James; ratings were up to watch a team most people love to hate and see lose. Could Mavericks' owner Mark Cuban have paid the officiating crew off in a sum that made what was coming from the league/network/major advertisers alliance look like small change? Sure, but to expound upon such a theory would label one as a conspiracy obsessive.
Speaking of losers, 22 of the 30 NBA teams lose money. Owners of the successful franchises want the players to pay for the small-market teams' share of revenue sharing. Smart. The players want the big-market profitable teams to split the profits with the small-market teams to create revenue sharing. The other major issues are average player salary and hard vs. soft salary caps. The owners want the players to give back a massive sum: over one-half billion dollars. The players have offered to compromise, but not nearly enough.
Due to the greed of the few big-market profitable teams that didn't effectuate a truer revenue sharing plan with the last CBA, those owners now do not have the votes to negotiate a quick settlement. For owners of franchises losing money under the current business plan, a lockout is profitable. A lockout means a smaller loss than playing. A majority of owners will sit this one out and wait until major concessions are offered by the players and/or the major-market profitable teams to reduce player salaries, guaranteed salaries, and to boost revenue sharing closer to the NFL model.
The other distinction between the NFL lockout and the NBA lockout concerns their respective drafts. The NFL had a great draft as usual, full of talented, experienced players. The NBA had a lean draft, filled with somewhat talented non-superstars with far less experience for the most part, thanks to the NBA's short-sighted raid-the-NCAA policy of allowing 19-year-olds to be drafted.
Because so many prep superstars are pampered from age 12 on in America, most do not take the time or have the discipline to learn all of the fundamentals. Perhaps that explains why so many international players were drafted this year: most are less athletic than their American counterparts, but they are more coachable and have a better handle on fundamentals.
Nowitzki's success in this year's finals may have also influenced the scouts and GM's. Obviously, nobody was paying attention to Stojakovich's lack of defense and rebounding that led to his benching in the same series, Peja being another player brought up on Euroball.
What was the problem with the NBA draft that has direct repercussions on the labor dispute? There were no Michael Jordans taken by bad teams. There were some players who might turn out to be good NBA journeymen. But no players were taken that should become NBA superstars. That's still a roll of the dice since most drafted, international and domestic, are too young to tell. Therefore, the small-market teams left draft night no closer to a title than when they arrived.
The lowly Sacramento Kings took Jimmer Fredette, an affable sharpshooter and consensus college player of the year. He's athletic like Steve Nash is athletic. He plays defense like Nash plays D. The last time the Kings took a short white guy who made national headlines, his name was Bobby Hurley. How did that turn out? One thing is certain: Fredette's addition has provided some short-term season ticket sales action.
Teams need fannies in the seats more than wins. That should illustrate the desperate times of small-market teams.
In sum, expect the NFL to settle soon. Expect the NBA to keep a lockout for the better part of a year. At least.
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